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MORAL EDUCATION AND 'EQUAL FREEDOM' 
ABSTRACT 
For there to be any point in speaking about "moral education .. there must be understanding 
of what it is to make moral decisions; for moral education is concerned with providing the 
machinery for decision-making in moral contexts. 
The decision-procedure which a person adopts allows him to make consistent and appropriate 
decisions by providing reasons which justify his moral judgement. 
In the first part of this thesis the argument is put forward that as morality is essentially a 
social phenomenon concerned with the way in which people act towards each other it must 
indicate what desirable behaviour is. Moral judgemen ts, which determine what desirable 
behaviour is, are guided_ by the fact that rational men show some respect for each other as 
persons and have the capacity to universalise the consequences of their actions or appreciate wha t 
would occur if others acted as they do . A reasonable assumption to makP, in considering basic 
moral principles seems to be that men prefer not to be interfered with. From this assumption 
the Principle of Equal Freedom is derived - Each person should attrihute equal value to the 
freedom of others as he does to his own freedom. Now in order to avoid interference where this 
is possible, there have to be means of establishing what other people might want or how they 
might act in situations where what one person does could affect what someone else can do. 
Sometimes we can identify ourselves with others and thus appreciate how they feel about a 
situation but this is not always possible no r appropriate: We therefore attempt to gauge how 
another is interpreting a situation, in order to · gain knowledge of his thoughts and feelings 
concerning the situation he finds himself in. To have some knowledge of another's feelings and 
thoughts about a situation involving conflict of interests is essential to the understanding of the 
priciple of equal freedom, however the principle in itself is insufficient, because people's wants 
and needs vary according to other values. To operate the principle we have to take cognizance of 
various other principles which might be derived from it. How each person relates particular values 
to the principle determines his moral code, which outlines how he justifie:; moral decisions he 
makes. 
The second part of the thesis begins by establishing that fonnal education is a process which is 
conce rned with passing on skills, ideas and values which society thinks ar~ worthwhile. The 
p assing on of values and how they can be interpreted as functional in guidir1r b'?haviour is the 
concern of moral education. Procedures to be adopted in moral eC:ucation must relate to what 
would be considered as the criteria for success in this kind of teaching to r ther~ must be some 
idea of what is hoped to be achieved. The principle of equal freedom encourage:-.. understanding 
of others and offers a bse fo r the establishment of a consistent dccision-prncedv1e for making 
moral judgements. By int roducing material which aids pupils to thillk :ibout and g:iin 
understanding of the li fe-sty les of others it is possible to help to develop the rr.e:irn, for justifying 
the moral judgements which have to be made. The thesis concludes with 511~gestions as to how 
the educator might encourage understanding of others without in any v-::.y interferir,g with the 
notions of moral autonomy and freedom of choice. 
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iv. 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
Considerable publicity is currently being given to the need for some form of moral education. 
Some social groups view the subject with a certain amount of suspicion, arguing that "moral 
education" is merely a formal justification for advancing the cause of the "permissive society", 
others see its function as something completely different, perhaps arguing that in fact it has, in 
varying degrees, been part and parcel of formal education systems in Western countries ever since 
the inception of public education. Before relevant discussion on this subject can take place 
however there must be some notion of what "morality" is about. 
Essentially morality is a social phenomenon - it is concerned with relationships people have 
with one another in a variety of contexts: It enables a person to decide for himself how he should 
act in real or imagined situations where his own interests and those of others are involved, by 
providing him with reasons for justifying a particular choice of action. Where a person is unsure 
of how he might go about justifying decisions of a moral nature which he is forced to make, his 
uncertainty will likely be expressed by confusion, or inconsistency in his choice of action. 
It is understandable that where confusion exists in morals, decision-making is hardest. It 
woulrl be logical for a society which operated a formal education system and where there seemed 
to o.ist confusion over the interpretation of some situations involving moral judgements, to feel 
it pertinent to consider how it might go about incorporating within the formal education system, 
tec.d~ing designed to contribute towards providing machinery for decision-making in moral 
contexts. 
Re~ognition of a need for some kind of moral education however raises the paradoxical 
problem of the desired acceptability of actions - in terms of society - and the freedom of the 
individual; for while it might be considered desirable to teach children moral rules and principles 
it must also be desirable to teach moral autonomy and freedom of choice if education is to be 
viewed as a learning process which respects each individual's capacity for rational thought. 
Last Century and during the early years of the Twentieth Century moral instruction in 
Western countries was generally based around the acceptance of Christian ethics and the 
subsequent indisputability of basic principles entailed by such a position. The desired result was 
the inculcation of certain moral principles and rules, expressed with clarity and expected to be 
adhered to in all situations, which provided the means for consistent and appropriate 
decision-making. In the context of formal education the child's acceptance of a moral code 
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ultimately based on a religious commitment was generally acknowledged to be the responsibility 
of institutions outside the school. The expressed secular nature of public education precluded the 
need for moral instruction to be seen as a formal function of the school except in cases where 
there might be conflict between accepted Christian morality, and values which that form of 
morality was not interpreted as implying. 
It is a fact of course that today many aspects of Christian ethics remain as guidelines for 
determining appropriate and acceptable moral behaviour, but their acceptance need not be based 
on particular religious beliefs nor inconsistent with moral autonomy. Moral education is not 
synonymous with religious education and thus a secular system of education can be maintained 
which involves the former. (One might also argue that secular education need not be inconsistent 
with learning about religious beliefs and ideas as opposed to actually participating in activities of 
a religious nature). It seems likely that moral education, or at least "instruction"1 in some form 
or another is an essential ingredient of formal education for the very nature of the activity 
implies acceptance of a social order which has pursuits considered worthwhile passing on, and 
that there are acceptable ways of going about the task of attempting to ensure that appropriate 
learning takes place. 
Currently it seems that educators and society alike are prepared to accept, at least to some 
extent, that schools should engage in some kind of moral education which helps children to 
understand the nature of moral decision-making, without getting involved with issues of a 
sectarian or dogmatic nature. Whether or not this is because Western societies appear to be 
placing less emphasis on the influence of religious ideals is largely a matter of opinion and as such 
not directly relevant to the case of moral education. Clearlv however, in the more affluent 
societies, higher standards of living and greater sophistication have lead to some changes in 
attitudes and values and a consequence of this does appear to have been (on the part of some at 
least) the expression of a certain amount of confusion regarding situations which we might 
consider to be appropriately tenned "moral" (because of the manner in which they involve other 
people) and about which decisions have to be made: confusion perhaps best being regarded as 
actions based on judgements where immediate satisfaction is the sole criterion for the choice of 
action. 
If there is to be argtfment for including moral education within a school curriculum as an 
intentional activity, a clearly defined basis must be established for enabling relevant material to 
be introduced: Further, such a basis must surely be of the least contentious nature possible and 
attempt to d"efine a procedure which will allow consistent and appropriate decision-making and 
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yet at the same time not exclude the concepts of autonomy and freedom of choice as they relate 
to each individual. (It is hoped that arguments developed in the first part of this thesis will 
provide a possible base for moral education, and that arguments put forward in the second part 
will indicate how such a base can (and does) relate to the realisation of a comprehensive 
programme for moral education.) 
1 
- · Some writers in the field of educational theory have drawn distinctions between the terms 
"education" and "instruction" - the latter term usually referring to the development of a 
particular skill or skills which are necessary for performing a particular operation successfully, 
while the former refers to a process which involves relating a variety of ideas and skills to a range 
of tasks which may be practical or theoretical in nature. The distinction is acknowledged and will 
generally be adhered to throughout this thesis, although it is felt that the terms can be used to 
express similar sentiments. 
3. 
PART ONE 
